A master key now has a set of servers (the panel's own and/or nodes). A
device's single WireGuard key becomes a peer on every server of its key,
each with its own IP and PSK, and config.servers[] lists them all.
- ui.db: master_servers (the key's set, never empty), device_peers (which
key is on which server, with the ip/psk that server issued),
peer_tombstones (peers to delete) and server_profiles (last known
profile of each server).
- Nothing is pushed blindly: reconcile() brings one server to the desired
state - deletes tombstones, adds peers, rekeys with PUT, fills ip/psk,
rotates a pending PSK - one pass per server at a time. It runs right
after every action, when a node connects and once a minute, so a node
that was offline catches up on rekeys, PSK changes and removals.
- config is built from ui.db, so an offline node stays in it and rev does
not flap; a server is listed once its peer carries the device's current
key. An empty config is never sent (502 instead); register and rekey
roll back if no server accepted the key.
- Existing keys and devices migrate on start. With one server the config
and its rev are byte-identical to 0.3.1 (checked by running both
versions on the same ui.db), so existing clients notice nothing.
- Panel: server checkboxes in the key settings instead of the placeholder
(the last one cannot be removed), "на N из M серверов" on devices that
have not reached every server yet, device stats summed over servers.
- SUB_HOST: the panel's public address for sen:// links and endpoints;
install.sh writes it. Without it a panel with no VPN of its own used
the address it was opened at.
- A node referenced by a key's server set cannot be deleted.
A node is a VPN server without a panel. awg-agent on it dials the panel
(core) over an outbound WSS connection and runs the panel's requests on its
own awg-ctrl, which stays on 127.0.0.1 and is unchanged. No inbound port on
the node, works behind NAT.
- awg-ui/nodes.ts: node registry in ui.db, WSS hub on NODE_PORT with a
self-signed cert whose SPKI pin goes into the join string, RPC with
timeouts, health polling, /ui/nodes routes.
- Nodes enroll with a one-time awgjoin:// string (secret stored hashed,
1 hour) and then authenticate by their own Ed25519 key. The agent checks
the pin before sending anything and only forwards /health, /api/*, /awg/*.
- server_id 0 is the panel's own awg-ctrl; LOCAL_NODE=off makes the panel
run without a VPN of its own. The panel picks a server with X-Server-Id,
API keys use their server_id. sen:// still serves one server.
- UI: a card per server in the server bar, switching remounts the tab,
«Добавить сервер» gives the join command.
- CLI: agent service, roles from cli.env, join / unjoin commands.
- Release archives include awg-agent.
A master key is a sen:// link with a device limit. Each device
generates its own WireGuard keypair and registers only the public key,
then polls a signed /sub/v1/config, so params and generation changes
reach users without re-importing a key.
- awg-ctrl: peers table and /api/peers*, /api/profile; nextIp and
rebuildConf take peers into account (output unchanged without them)
- awg-ui: link codec and signatures (sen.ts), registry, panel routes
and the public listener on SUB_PORT (sub.ts)
- responses are always Ed25519-signed; TLS with a pinned self-signed
certificate is optional
- devices report a client version, shown as platform-version
- "Мастер-ключи" tab: a table with the devices nested under each key,
a device-limit meter, per-key settings and a placeholder for the
servers a key serves; cards on mobile
- install.sh/CLI: subscription signing key, optional certificate, port;
kept across reinstalls with KEEP_DATA
- add the missing mock-server.ts used by npm run dev:mock
Commit 0dbb13f removed the whole feature: the apikeys tab, the /ui/apikeys
routes, requireApiKey, the /api/v1 router, the ApiKey type, the better-sqlite3
dependency and UI_DB_FILE in the CLI and the installer. Only the untracked
awg-ui/API.md survived, so the README went on to claim there was no key-based
API at all.
Restores all of it: ui.db with the api_keys table, awgk_ key generation storing
only the SHA-256 and a display prefix, the JWT-guarded CRUD, and the /api/v1
router mounted before the JWT proxy on /api so the key auth is not swallowed.
The tab comes back as its own folder and the registry picks it up on its own.
UI_DB_FILE points at /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/ui.db, outside the install tree, so
reinstalling keeps the keys; a fresh install moves the old one aside with its
WAL sidecars.
better-sqlite3 takes the slot of jsonwebtoken, which arrived with the MA7
integration and has been unused since 068cab4 removed it.
One defect is not reproduced: the /api/v1 handlers called ctrl() without a
try/catch, and Express 4 does not catch async rejections, so a single request
with awg-ctrl down killed the panel process. They now answer 502 like proxy()
already did.
The API contract is documented in the README rather than linked: .gitignore
excludes every markdown but README.md, so awg-ui/API.md is not in the repo and
the link would break on a clone.
Checked against a running server: login, key create/list/delete, 400 on a bad
label, 401 without a JWT, "API key required" rather than "Unauthorized" on
/api/v1, "Invalid API key" for a deleted key, last_used updating, and all three
/api/v1 routes returning 502 with the process still alive.
install.sh now defaults to AWG_GEN=3.1: an incompatible module or kernel
fails with diagnostics instead of silently falling back to 2.0 and handing
out a server with weaker obfuscation. AWG_GEN=auto keeps the old fallback
for old kernels, AWG_GEN=2.0 still forces 2.0.
Servers already installed on 2.0 no longer need a reinstall: POST
/awg/upgrade (button in the users tab) backs up awg1.conf, rewrites
[Interface] with HeaderProtectionKey and the 3.1 block install.sh writes,
raises any S1-S4 below 12 (header protection needs a 12-byte nonce and the
module only reports "Invalid argument"), restarts the interface and
reissues every vpn:// key. Bringing the interface up is the only real proof
the kernel accepted the params, so a failure restores the previous conf and
brings 2.0 back up. Reissue is not optional: 2.0-era keys stop working the
moment the generation changes.
restartAwg() now re-reads the obfuscation params, generation and keepalive
from awg1.conf before syncing peers. The conf can change while the
interface is down, and a stale CONFIG.gen meant new keys were built on the
old params.
README: install from git.ma7neko.ru (Gitea) instead of raw.githubusercontent,
and document the 3.1 default with the AWG_GEN=auto escape hatch.
Upstream AmneziaWG 3.x is still shifting under active development
(unanswered kernel-module issues around header protection and
handshake-without-data regressions), so give operators an explicit
opt-out/opt-in instead of always auto-selecting 3.1, and pin the
installed package so unattended-upgrades can't swap the module under
a live server. Surface the running module/tools version and protocol
generation through /health, the CLI status command, and the panel's
server card so a mismatch is visible instead of silent.
Protocol generation is now derived from awg1.conf rather than stored: an
interface speaks 3.1 when HeaderProtectionKey is set and 2.0 otherwise. The
3.0/3.1-only keys (HeaderProtectionKey, ContentPaddingAddition, the
Rekey/Reject/Keepalive timers, MaxHandshakeAttempts, RandomTrailers,
DisableCookies) are read from the conf and emitted only when non-empty, so 2.0
output stays byte-identical — verified by diffing both the client .conf and the
full vpn:// string against the previous implementation.
Changing generation invalidates every issued vpn:// key, so add
POST /api/users/reissue. It recovers the client private key from inside the
stored blob (the only place it exists), keeping ip/pub_key/psk_key intact, so
nothing changes on the wire and users only need to re-import. users gains
key_gen and vpn_key_prev, and users.db is snapshotted before the pass.
install.sh gates 3.1 on module 3.x and kernel >= 5.5 (header protection needs
the chacha library API, absent before 5.5) and falls back to writing a 2.0 conf
instead of aborting, so older kernels keep working as before.
HeaderProtectionKey is generated with awg genpsk and preserved on KEEP_DATA.
The panel marks keys issued on a different generation and offers to reissue
them; /api/v1 now returns gen alongside name/ip/vpn_key.
Also add MIT license headers across the awg-ui sources.
maeneko