A panel without VPN (e.g. after the move) can use a Prometheus that lives on
a node, such as the one with history left on the old server (node #0). Both
directions go through the agent's WSS: the node's Prometheus scrapes
127.0.0.1:AGENT_METRICS_PORT/metrics, the agent checks its token and asks
core (metrics → metrics_res, the same exposition as /metrics, at most once
per 5 s per connection); the monitor tab reads it back through the agent,
which forwards only GET /-/ready and /api/v1/query[_range]. The panel finds
it by itself (local first, then the lowest-id node), and the install/remove
buttons work on a panel without VPN. `monitor install` on a node without its
own panel picks AGENT_METRICS_PORT, writes it to cli.env and restarts the
agent; on the old server it keeps the collected data.
The panel works behind nginx in a subfolder: relative asset and API paths,
relative directory redirects, and the client address from X-Forwarded-For /
X-Real-IP only from trusted proxies (loopback, TRUST_PROXY).
migrate import opens the moved SUB_PORT/NODE_PORT in UFW when it is active.
The «Перенос» tab moves a panel + VPN server to a panel-only server without
users noticing: the new panel issues a one-time awgmove:// code, the old one
sends its ui.db, subscription keys and hub certificate encrypted with it, and
becomes node #0 of the new panel. Server id 0 is kept, so config servers[] is
byte-identical. The old server relays its former ports (awg-relay, PROXY v1
header trusted only from RELAY_FROM), so sen:// links, nodes and the API keep
working. The same is available from the CLI: migrate export/import/cancel,
rehome.
Nodes now learn the panel's address: the hub sends it in ready, the agent
stores it in CORE_ENDPOINT, dials it first and confirms with core_ok. The
new panel shows when the old server can be turned off: devices that got the
new address, nodes that confirmed it, master keys never opened.
«Серверы для всех» on the master keys tab adds or removes servers on every
live key in one go, with a dry run that warns about API keys that would lose
sight of some keys, and sets the servers new keys get.
masterDevices skips a server that did not answer and reports it as
unreachable; peers are fetched once per server per pass. The tab loads each
key on its own, counts devices from the key when the list is missing (and still
asks before unbinding), drops stale responses, labels an IP from another
server and blocks a double create. masterFor answers 403 instead of 404 for a
key that exists but is outside the API key's servers, so a client does not
mistake it for a deleted one. updateMaster checks every statement in its
transaction.
Status, priority/torrent chips and IP columns like the users tab; the API
returns each device's IP per server. The key row sums its devices (online,
priority, traffic); key UUID and device ID sit under the name, copy on click.
The torrent flag was read inside loops over users rows (users/stats,
peers, metrics) and each read queried the config table. SQLite has a
single connection here, so the nested query waited for it forever: the
first stats request or Prometheus scrape locked awg-ctrl for good, and
the panel showed no users and timed out.
- the block setting is kept in memory (loaded at start, updated on
save), so the flag never touches the database
- the set of flagged IPs is taken once before the query, not per row
- regression test: collectMetrics must finish with users in the table
Panel: a 401 from the panel itself (its JWT not accepted) now returns to
the login screen; a 401 relayed from a node's awg-ctrl does not.
- awg-ctrl: optional nft table awg_torrent (GET/PUT /api/torrent, off by
default). A connection is judged by its first packets, like Xray's
sniffing: DHT, UDP trackers, uTP SYN, and with @ih support the plain
TCP handshake and HTTP announce. A match marks the connection in
conntrack and drops it whole; without @ih only the UDP part is used
- devices that tried are kept in a 10-minute set and flagged as
"torrent" in user and device stats; with shaping on they sit in the
background class while the flag lasts
- metrics: awg_torrent_block_enabled/active, awg_torrent_blocked_total,
awg_torrent_devices and per-peer awg_peer_torrent
- panel: "Торренты" section in server settings, "торренты" chip on users
and devices; Save sends only what changed
- ranges 7d (30 min step) and 30d (2 h step); Prometheus keeps 31d
- rate() window is at least the step, so long views show averages
instead of a 2-minute sample; "now" values still use a 2m window
- overview returns used_down/used_up: increase() of the interface
counters over the whole range
- tiles merged: traffic (with volume for the period), devices, load
Baseline TypeScript version before the Go rewrite: CAKE fair sharing with
automatic deprioritisation of heavy devices, per-key priority, /metrics with
a metrics token, the built-in Prometheus install/remove, the Monitor tab,
grouped sidebar tabs and the dead-peer audit.
Lowering device_limit below the number of bound devices now forgets the
extra ones right away, newest first, so the devices that took their
slots first keep them. Their peers are removed and they get 410 like a
revoke from the panel. PATCH returns the unbound ids; the panel names
the devices that will be dropped and asks before saving.
- master_keys.uuid (UUID v4, unique index): new keys get one on create,
existing keys once on start. It survives rotate (new secret) and
relabel, so it identifies the key itself rather than its link.
- /ui/masterkeys* and /api/v1/masterkeys* return uuid, and :id in those
paths accepts the numeric id or the uuid.
- /sub/v1 register, peek and devices return key_uuid, so a client can
recognise the same key behind a reissued link. It is not in the sen://
link (that would need a new format) and not in config, so rev and
existing clients are unaffected - checked against a 0.3.1 ui.db.
- Panel: the uuid sits in the key's row like a device ID (full value in
the tooltip, click copies) and in the key settings with a copy button;
on mobile it is shown under the key's name.
- README: uuid in the master key API.
- awg-agent sends its install's VERSION (from the CLI's env, else the
project's .env) in the auth frame; the hub keeps it in nodes.version
(added by migration), so an offline node still shows the last one.
- GET /ui/nodes returns version per server (0 is the panel's own) and the
panel's version at the top.
- ServerBar: a vX.Y.Z chip next to the AWG generation. A node older or
newer than the panel, or one that sends no version (agent before
0.3.4, shown as v?.?.?), gets a warm chip with an "update it" tooltip.
- App.css: tertiary-container tokens from design.md (light) and a warm
dark pair; they did not exist yet.
- Mock server: panel 0.3.3, Frankfurt behind on 0.3.2, Amsterdam with no
version.
API keys now see a set of servers instead of one, and /api/v1 gains the
master-key operations the panel already had.
- api_key_servers holds each key's servers (migrated from server_id,
which stays the default server for /api/v1/users). /users follows
X-Server-Id within the set; a server outside it is 404. PATCH
/ui/apikeys/:id changes the set without reissuing the key.
- /api/v1/masterkeys: create (returns the sen:// link), list, get with
link and devices, patch label/limit/servers, rotate, rekey, delete, and
nested device routes (unlink, rekey, PSK). A key sees a master key only
if all of its servers are in the key's set, so it cannot delete or
re-point service on a server it cannot see; anything else is 404,
servers outside the set are 403. Creating refuses with 503 before
writing anything if the subscription cannot issue links.
- sub.ts: the panel routes and the API share one service layer, the
panel's behaviour is unchanged.
- Node deletion: owners check in beforeDelete (no writes, a later hook
may still veto) and clean up in afterDelete. Previously a forced delete
could release a waiting master key and then be vetoed. A node that is
the only server of an API key is refused; other keys just lose it.
- Panel: server checkboxes are a shared ServerPicker, used by the master
key settings and the new API key settings row; the API keys table shows
each key's servers.
- README: the API section covers server sets and master keys.
A deleted master key could keep letting its devices in: ui.db learns what
is on a server only from awg-ctrl's reply, and a node that executed a
request whose 504/502 reply got lost, or a device deleted while a
reconcile pass was in flight, left a peer nothing remembered to remove.
- awg-ctrl: PUT /api/peers/sync takes a panel's full list of wanted keys
and removes every other peer of that panel's area. Removal is driven
only by such an explicit list, never by time or inactivity: a panel
that is offline sends nothing, so nothing is deleted. Registered before
PUT /api/peers/:pub, with its own 512 kB body limit.
- Every panel has a stable id (ui.db, mirrored to awg-ui/panel.id) and
adds peers as "<panel>/m<key>/d<device>", so two panels on one awg-ctrl
never touch each other's peers. Legacy "m1/d2" peers are claimed only
when their key is in the panel's list.
- Each reconcile pass ends with the sync, built from ui.db at that moment.
Its reply also self-heals: a device whose key is missing on a server
(a rekey rolled back after a lost reply) is added again.
- Deleting a master key stops it at once but keeps it listed as
"Удаляется — ждёт: …" until every server confirms, instead of saying
"deleted" while an offline node still lets the devices in.
- Deleting a node reconciles it first; if it is offline or has not
confirmed a deleted key, it takes ?force=1 and a warning. Tombstones
are no longer dropped silently.
- /sub/v1: an unknown device gets a signed 410 revoked that does not count
towards the failure limit (dead clients behind one node NAT used to
lock everyone out), every response echoes the request's ts and device,
and 401 reasons and the first 429 per window are logged. config and rev
are unchanged, byte-identical on one server.
- CLI: `awg-ctrl peers [drop <area|legacy>]` lists and removes
subscription peers by area; `join --no-panel` asks whether to keep or
drop the panel's own peers (NODE_PEERS=keep|drop).
A master key now has a set of servers (the panel's own and/or nodes). A
device's single WireGuard key becomes a peer on every server of its key,
each with its own IP and PSK, and config.servers[] lists them all.
- ui.db: master_servers (the key's set, never empty), device_peers (which
key is on which server, with the ip/psk that server issued),
peer_tombstones (peers to delete) and server_profiles (last known
profile of each server).
- Nothing is pushed blindly: reconcile() brings one server to the desired
state - deletes tombstones, adds peers, rekeys with PUT, fills ip/psk,
rotates a pending PSK - one pass per server at a time. It runs right
after every action, when a node connects and once a minute, so a node
that was offline catches up on rekeys, PSK changes and removals.
- config is built from ui.db, so an offline node stays in it and rev does
not flap; a server is listed once its peer carries the device's current
key. An empty config is never sent (502 instead); register and rekey
roll back if no server accepted the key.
- Existing keys and devices migrate on start. With one server the config
and its rev are byte-identical to 0.3.1 (checked by running both
versions on the same ui.db), so existing clients notice nothing.
- Panel: server checkboxes in the key settings instead of the placeholder
(the last one cannot be removed), "на N из M серверов" on devices that
have not reached every server yet, device stats summed over servers.
- SUB_HOST: the panel's public address for sen:// links and endpoints;
install.sh writes it. Without it a panel with no VPN of its own used
the address it was opened at.
- A node referenced by a key's server set cannot be deleted.
A node is a VPN server without a panel. awg-agent on it dials the panel
(core) over an outbound WSS connection and runs the panel's requests on its
own awg-ctrl, which stays on 127.0.0.1 and is unchanged. No inbound port on
the node, works behind NAT.
- awg-ui/nodes.ts: node registry in ui.db, WSS hub on NODE_PORT with a
self-signed cert whose SPKI pin goes into the join string, RPC with
timeouts, health polling, /ui/nodes routes.
- Nodes enroll with a one-time awgjoin:// string (secret stored hashed,
1 hour) and then authenticate by their own Ed25519 key. The agent checks
the pin before sending anything and only forwards /health, /api/*, /awg/*.
- server_id 0 is the panel's own awg-ctrl; LOCAL_NODE=off makes the panel
run without a VPN of its own. The panel picks a server with X-Server-Id,
API keys use their server_id. sen:// still serves one server.
- UI: a card per server in the server bar, switching remounts the tab,
«Добавить сервер» gives the join command.
- CLI: agent service, roles from cli.env, join / unjoin commands.
- Release archives include awg-agent.
A master key is a sen:// link with a device limit. Each device
generates its own WireGuard keypair and registers only the public key,
then polls a signed /sub/v1/config, so params and generation changes
reach users without re-importing a key.
- awg-ctrl: peers table and /api/peers*, /api/profile; nextIp and
rebuildConf take peers into account (output unchanged without them)
- awg-ui: link codec and signatures (sen.ts), registry, panel routes
and the public listener on SUB_PORT (sub.ts)
- responses are always Ed25519-signed; TLS with a pinned self-signed
certificate is optional
- devices report a client version, shown as platform-version
- "Мастер-ключи" tab: a table with the devices nested under each key,
a device-limit meter, per-key settings and a placeholder for the
servers a key serves; cards on mobile
- install.sh/CLI: subscription signing key, optional certificate, port;
kept across reinstalls with KEEP_DATA
- add the missing mock-server.ts used by npm run dev:mock
Commit 0dbb13f removed the whole feature: the apikeys tab, the /ui/apikeys
routes, requireApiKey, the /api/v1 router, the ApiKey type, the better-sqlite3
dependency and UI_DB_FILE in the CLI and the installer. Only the untracked
awg-ui/API.md survived, so the README went on to claim there was no key-based
API at all.
Restores all of it: ui.db with the api_keys table, awgk_ key generation storing
only the SHA-256 and a display prefix, the JWT-guarded CRUD, and the /api/v1
router mounted before the JWT proxy on /api so the key auth is not swallowed.
The tab comes back as its own folder and the registry picks it up on its own.
UI_DB_FILE points at /etc/amnezia/amneziawg/ui.db, outside the install tree, so
reinstalling keeps the keys; a fresh install moves the old one aside with its
WAL sidecars.
better-sqlite3 takes the slot of jsonwebtoken, which arrived with the MA7
integration and has been unused since 068cab4 removed it.
One defect is not reproduced: the /api/v1 handlers called ctrl() without a
try/catch, and Express 4 does not catch async rejections, so a single request
with awg-ctrl down killed the panel process. They now answer 502 like proxy()
already did.
The API contract is documented in the README rather than linked: .gitignore
excludes every markdown but README.md, so awg-ui/API.md is not in the repo and
the link would break on a clone.
Checked against a running server: login, key create/list/delete, 400 on a bad
label, 401 without a JWT, "API key required" rather than "Unauthorized" on
/api/v1, "Invalid API key" for a deleted key, last_used updating, and all three
/api/v1 routes returning 502 with the process still alive.
The product name, the channel word "Alpha" and the version were scattered
across install.sh, the CLI banner, two spots in App.tsx and three
package.json files, so a rename or a bump meant editing strings in code.
They now live in one committed .env at the project root (BRAND, CHANNEL,
VERSION), shipped inside the release archive and read at runtime: the CLI
loads it after cli.env — so real env and machine settings still win — and
injects the three values into awg-ui, which serves them from GET /ui/brand
for the wordmark. awg-ui also parses the same file directly, so
`npm run server` in dev shows what production shows.
install.sh keeps its own VERSION and CHANNEL and says why: it prints the
banner and builds the release URL before the archive holding .env has been
downloaded. It writes BRAND into cli.env only when the operator passed one
explicitly, so the file stays the single source otherwise.
Version bumped to Beta 0.2.0 across .env, install.sh and the three
package.json files.
Nothing about the install was overridable: the archive could only come from
one GitHub repo, the connectivity precheck pinged github.com whatever the
source was, and the product name was duplicated across install.sh, the CLI
banner and two spots in App.tsx.
install.sh now reads REPO_BASE (default the Gitea mirror), REPO_FALLBACK
(default GitHub), ARCHIVE_URL and BRAND from the environment. Gitea and
GitHub share the same release path, so one scheme covers both:
download_extract tries the primary, warns and falls back to the secondary,
and fails with both URLs listed. The fallback carries real weight today —
the Gitea repo is a pull mirror that does not sync releases, so artifacts
live only on GitHub until release sync is enabled there. The precheck now
probes the hosts actually used.
BRAND flows install.sh -> cli.env -> CLI banner and awg-ui, which exposes
it via GET /ui/brand along with the package version. That route is
unauthenticated because the wordmark is on the login screen, before a JWT
exists; the SPA falls back to a constant if it fails. Renaming a fork is
one environment variable, and no version string is hardcoded in the UI or
the CLI any more.
Also adds /ui to the Vite dev proxy (GET /ui/brand and the API-keys tab
were unreachable in dev), documents the overrides in the README, fixes a
typo in the API.md base URL and states there that the API is not bound to
any host.
install.sh now defaults to AWG_GEN=3.1: an incompatible module or kernel
fails with diagnostics instead of silently falling back to 2.0 and handing
out a server with weaker obfuscation. AWG_GEN=auto keeps the old fallback
for old kernels, AWG_GEN=2.0 still forces 2.0.
Servers already installed on 2.0 no longer need a reinstall: POST
/awg/upgrade (button in the users tab) backs up awg1.conf, rewrites
[Interface] with HeaderProtectionKey and the 3.1 block install.sh writes,
raises any S1-S4 below 12 (header protection needs a 12-byte nonce and the
module only reports "Invalid argument"), restarts the interface and
reissues every vpn:// key. Bringing the interface up is the only real proof
the kernel accepted the params, so a failure restores the previous conf and
brings 2.0 back up. Reissue is not optional: 2.0-era keys stop working the
moment the generation changes.
restartAwg() now re-reads the obfuscation params, generation and keepalive
from awg1.conf before syncing peers. The conf can change while the
interface is down, and a stale CONFIG.gen meant new keys were built on the
old params.
README: install from git.ma7neko.ru (Gitea) instead of raw.githubusercontent,
and document the 3.1 default with the AWG_GEN=auto escape hatch.
Upstream AmneziaWG 3.x is still shifting under active development
(unanswered kernel-module issues around header protection and
handshake-without-data regressions), so give operators an explicit
opt-out/opt-in instead of always auto-selecting 3.1, and pin the
installed package so unattended-upgrades can't swap the module under
a live server. Surface the running module/tools version and protocol
generation through /health, the CLI status command, and the panel's
server card so a mismatch is visible instead of silent.
Three defects surfaced on a real upgrade from 2.0.
The module gate read modinfo, which reports the version on disk. apt
--only-upgrade rebuilds the DKMS module but does not replace the one already
loaded, so the installer wrote a 3.1 conf that the running 2.0 module rejected
with 'Unable to modify interface: Invalid argument'. It now compares
/sys/module/amneziawg/version, reloads the module when it lags behind the disk,
and decides the generation from the loaded version only.
Bringing the interface up is the only real proof the kernel accepted the 3.1
parameters, so a failure there no longer aborts the install: it enables dynamic
debug, retries, prints the amneziawg lines from dmesg, then strips the 3.x keys
and comes up on 2.0. The rejected conf is kept as awg1.conf.awg31.
PostUp appends 'iptables -A FORWARD', but UFW inserts its jumps at the head of
the chain, so client traffic was dropped with '[UFW BLOCK] IN=awg1 OUT=eth0' —
the tunnel connected and had no internet. When UFW is active the installer now
adds 'ufw route allow in on awg1 out on eth0' and opens the AWG and UI ports.
Version 0.1.4.1.
install.sh drives the release URL and tarball name off VERSION, so the
matching tag is v0.1.4. awg-ctrl/package.json was still on the default 1.0.0
and is now in step with cli and awg-ui.
Protocol generation is now derived from awg1.conf rather than stored: an
interface speaks 3.1 when HeaderProtectionKey is set and 2.0 otherwise. The
3.0/3.1-only keys (HeaderProtectionKey, ContentPaddingAddition, the
Rekey/Reject/Keepalive timers, MaxHandshakeAttempts, RandomTrailers,
DisableCookies) are read from the conf and emitted only when non-empty, so 2.0
output stays byte-identical — verified by diffing both the client .conf and the
full vpn:// string against the previous implementation.
Changing generation invalidates every issued vpn:// key, so add
POST /api/users/reissue. It recovers the client private key from inside the
stored blob (the only place it exists), keeping ip/pub_key/psk_key intact, so
nothing changes on the wire and users only need to re-import. users gains
key_gen and vpn_key_prev, and users.db is snapshotted before the pass.
install.sh gates 3.1 on module 3.x and kernel >= 5.5 (header protection needs
the chacha library API, absent before 5.5) and falls back to writing a 2.0 conf
instead of aborting, so older kernels keep working as before.
HeaderProtectionKey is generated with awg genpsk and preserved on KEEP_DATA.
The panel marks keys issued on a different generation and offers to reissue
them; /api/v1 now returns gen alongside name/ip/vpn_key.
Also add MIT license headers across the awg-ui sources.
maeneko